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*P.L. 89 Of all forms of expression, political expression receives the highest level of protection under
art.10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The European Court of Human Rights
(the Court) has stated on numerous occasions that freedom of expression constitutes one of the
essential foundations of democratic society.1 Freedom of political debate is said to be at the “very
core of the concept of democratic society which prevails throughout the Convention”.2
*P.L. 90 Expression is therefore valued for instrumental reasons, being regarded as a sine qua non
of political democracy.3 Furthermore, political democracy is at the very hub of the system of rights
protection provided for under the ECHR.4 The Court has stated that democracy appears “to be the
only political model contemplated by the Convention and, accordingly, the only one compatible with
it”.5
By the same token the courts in the United Kingdom have stressed the importance of expression
under the common law in terms of its contribution to democracy. For example, in R. v Secretary of
State for the Home Department Ex p. Simms, Lord Steyn put it thus:
“Freedom of speech is the lifeblood of democracy. The free flow of information and ideas informs
political debate. It is a safety valve: people are more ready to accept decisions that go against them if
they can in principle seek to influence them. It acts as a brake on the abuse of power by public
officials. It facilitates the exposure of errors in the governance and administration of justice of the
country.”6
Since, according to courts at any rate, political democracy is the main virtue whose preservation
bestows upon freedom of expression its great value, it follows that the preservation of democracy
itself must be of equal, if not greater, importance. Thus, the question arises of what should be done
when unfettered freedom of expression threatens to undermine the integrity of democracy itself? This
conflict most obviously arises where political organisations espouse policies that, if put into effect,
would subvert democratic processes and institutions.7 However it may occur, not just because of the
content of the message, but also because of the nature of the medium in which the message is
conveyed.
Despite the growth of the internet in recent years, the most powerful medium of modern mass
communication would appear to remain that of broadcasting. It can be used to communicate
messages to millions of people in persuasive, seductive and effective ways. For this reason
broadcasting is one of the most popular and successful tools of the commercial advertiser. Yet
broadcast advertising can be used, not solely by companies wishing to advertise branded products,
but also by organisations with political or quasi-political agendas wishing to communicate their
message and persuade people to their way of thinking. It immediately becomes apparent that those
organisations willing and/or able to purchase air time will be at a significant advantage in *P.L. 91 the
game of political persuasion as compared to those organisations unwilling and/or unable to afford
such expenditure. There will be a tendency for the field of political discourse to be tilted in favour of
the wealthiest players, and this will create a risk that equality of opportunity in the democratic process
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will be undermined.
There exists, therefore, a tension between freedom of political expression --which includes the
freedom to communicate one's message in the medium of one's choice--and the equality of
opportunity to communicate one's message in as effective a way as possible.8 There are obvious
problems with setting the balance too far in favour of freedom of expression. As Cass Sunstein has
put it in the context of First Amendment challenges to legislative restrictions on campaign expenditure
in the United States:
“People who are able to organise themselves in such a way as to be able to spend large amounts of
cash should not be able to influence politics more than people who are not similarly able … it is most
troublesome if people with a good deal of money are allowed to translate their wealth into political
influence. It is equally troublesome if the electoral process translates poverty into an absence of
political influence.”9
In the United States this tension has, nevertheless, been resolved very much in favour of freedom of
speech. In Buckley v Valeo the Supreme Court held that laws which placed limitations on campaign
expenditure were in breach of the First Amendment.10 The Court said that “the concept that the
Government may restrict the speech of some in our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment”.11 Moreover, the Court added that if the purpose of
such laws was to promote political equality they would be constitutionally unacceptable.12
Closely related to the substantive question of how the appropriate balance should be struck between
freedom of political expression and equality of political opportunity, there is an equally important
procedural question: what should be the role of the court in the adjudication of challenges to the
balance that has been struck by the democratically elected legislature? Should it adopt an attitude of
activism or restraint?
*P.L. 92 In R. (on the application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture,
Media and Sport (ADI ), the House of Lords considered the question of whether the statutory ban on
“political” advertising on UK radio and television is compatible with the right to freedom of expression
under art.10 ECHR.13 Their Lordships answered this question in the affirmative. This article seeks to
explore the issues sketched out above through the prism of this decision. To this end the article will
outline the domestic statutory position in relation to broadcast political advertising, the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights and the decision in ADI itself. Then the reasons advanced by the
House of Lords for its adoption of a stance highly deferential to Parliament's decision to impose a
blanket ban on all “political” broadcast advertising will be subjected to critical analysis. The next part
will examine the implications of obiter dicta in their Lordships' speeches suggesting that, given one of
a number of different factual matrices the ban could, in the future, be found to breach art.10 after all.
The article concludes with the suggestion that these dicta seriously undermine the efficacy of the ban.
Moreover, it is argued that their Lordships' dicta reveal a deep ambivalence concerning both the
substantive question of what is the correct balance to be struck between freedom of expression and
equality of political opportunity; and the procedural question of what is the proper role of the court
itself when undertaking judicial review of this aspect of the democratic process.
The United Kingdom's ban on broadcast political advertising, the Strasbourg position
and the decision in ADI
In the field of broadcasting the United Kingdom has historically adopted an approach which favours
equality of political opportunity at the expense of freedom of political expression. A succession of
statutes regulating broadcasting have maintained a ban on political advertising in the broadcast
media.14 The most recent, the Communications Act 2003, prohibits the broadcasting of political
advertisements on television and radio.15 Under s.321 an advertisement will contravene this
prohibition if it is “by or on behalf of a body whose objects are wholly or mainly of a political nature”16
or is an “advertisement which is directed towards a political end”.17 Section 321(3) defines “objects of
political nature” and “political ends” widely so as to include: “influencing the outcome of elections or
referendums” 18 ; “bringing about changes in the *P.L. 93 law … or otherwise influencing the
legislative process” 19 ; “influencing the policies or decisions of governments” 20 ; “influencing the
policies or decisions of persons on whom public functions are conferred by law” 21 or “international
agreements” 22 ; “influencing public opinion on a matter which, in the UK, is a matter of public
controversy”23 ; and “promoting the interests of a party or other group of persons organised in the UK
or elsewhere for political ends”.24
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During the passage of the Communications Bill Tessa Jowell MP, Secretary of State for Culture,
Media and Sport, explained the rationale for this prohibition along the following lines:
“By denying powerful interests the chance to skew political debate, the current ban safeguards the
public and democratic debate, and protects the impartiality of broadcasters.”25
The driving force behind the political broadcasting ban apparently lies in concerns over electoral and
party political matters. Its reach, however, is far wider, neither being restricted to advertising at or
around election periods, nor to advertisements placed by political parties alone. Indeed its wide terms
will catch any “social advocacy advertising” which aims to affect public opinion on matters of
controversy.26 Furthermore, even though the policy behind the ban is to prevent the playing field of
political debate being distorted by wealthy interests, it will also ensnare those with modest resources,
who lack the financial muscle to skew the pitch in their favour. The question thus arises whether this
blanket ban on political advertising, so widely defined, can meet the strictures of proportionality
required to justify interference with the right to freedom of expression under the ECHR?
*P.L. 94 The Strasbourg position
As noted above, the European Court has been assiduous in its general protection of political
expression.27 It applied this free speech jurisprudence to the issue of a ban on political broadcast
advertising in VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland. 28 The purpose of the Swiss ban was to:
“Protect public opinion from the pressures of powerful financial groups and from undue commercial
influence and to provide a certain equality of opportunity among different forces in society, to ensure
editorial independence from powerful sponsors and support the press.”29
VgT, an animal rights organisation, made a short commercial in response to adverts by the meat
industry. The advert compared, unfavourably, the lives of factory farmed pigs with those of their forest
dwelling counterparts and concluded by imploring viewers to “Eat less meat, for the sake of the
animals, your health and the environment”. VgT was prevented from broadcasting the commercial in
accordance with Swiss law on the grounds that it was “political”.30 Having failed to secure redress in
the Swiss court, VgT applied to Strasbourg claiming a breach of art.10 ECHR. The European Court
accepted that the aim of protecting equality of opportunity in the political process was legitimate and
that some restrictions in pursuit of this aim may be permissible.31 However the blanket ban constituted
a disproportionate interference with freedom of expression, since VgT was patently not one of those
wealthy groups that the ban had in its sights. The Court observed that all VgT intended to do was to
“participate in an ongoing general debate on animal protection and the rearing of animals”.32 Thus, the
reasons for the ban were held by the Court not to be “relevant and sufficient”.33 Moreover, because
this was a restriction of political expression (albeit in the context of broadcasting commercials, an
area in which a considerable degree of latitude is usually granted to states) the margin of appreciation
to be afforded was necessarily narrowed.34
In contrast to its decision in VgT the Court in Murphy v Ireland held that a broadcasting ban on
religious advertising in Ireland did not infringe the art.10 *P.L. 95 rights of a pastor who wished to
publicise a religious meeting. The Court distinguished VgT on the basis that a wider margin of
appreciation should “generally” be accorded to states in the field of religion.35
The decision in VgT posed problems for the UK Government during the passage of the
Communications Bill. Indeed, the Government was so unsure about the compatibility of the ban
during the passage of the Bill it took the highly unusual step of making a statement under s.19(1)(b) of
the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) to the effect that it was unable to make a statement that the Bill
was compatible with Convention rights. Many of the issues underpinning this decision were
considered recently by the House of Lords in the ADI case.
The House of Lords and ADI
Animal Defenders International is a non-profit, non-charitable organisation which campaigns to
alleviate the suffering of animals. It wished to air a television advert to publicise a campaign entitled
“My Mate's a Primate”, highlighting the misuse and abuse of primates by humans. Clearance for the
advert was however declined on the basis that ADI was a body whose objects were “mainly of a
political nature”.36 ADI therefore applied for judicial review, seeking a declaration under s.4 of the HRA
that the statutory ban was incompatible with its rights under art.10 ECHR on the grounds of
proportionality.37
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On the face of it the Strasbourg case law seemed to weigh heavily in favour of ADI, because the facts
of its case and those of VgT appeared to be “very similar”.38 Moreover, neither VgT nor ADI were the
kind of groups that had sufficient resources to skew the democratic process by buying up large
chunks of airtime. Nevertheless, the Divisional Court declined to grant the declaration sought.
Instead, it held that the ban was aimed at supporting the democratic process by preventing unfair
advantage being obtained by those groups that were able and willing to pay for advertising in the
most potent and pervasive of media.39
The House of Lords unanimously upheld the decision of the Divisional Court in a “leap-frogged”
appeal.40 The key issue was whether the statutory ban was “necessary in a democratic society”.
Reciting the freedom of speech side of the equation, Lord Bingham noted that “free communication of
*P.L. 96 information, opinions and argument about laws which a state should enact and policies its
government … should pursue [was] an essential condition of truly democratic government”.41
However, he added that it was also “highly desirable that the playing field of debate should as far as
possible be level”.42 Lord Bingham proceeded to enunciate the classical “equality of opportunity”
argument:
“This [level playing field] is not achieved if political parties can, in proportion to their resources, buy
unlimited opportunities to advertise in the most effective media, so that elections become little more
than an auction. Nor is it achieved if well-endowed interests which are not political parties are able to
use the power of the purse to give enhanced prominence to views which may be true or false,
attractive to progressive minds or unattractive, beneficial or injurious. The risk is that objects which
are essentially political may come to be accepted by the public not because they are shown by public
debate to be right but because, by dint of constant repetition, the public has been conditioned to
accept them. The rights of others which a restriction on the exercise of the right to free expression
may properly be designed to protect must … include a right to be protected against the potential
mischief of partial political advertising.”43
The crucial question, of course, was whether a complete prohibition on all broadcast “political”
advertisements, as defined in ss.319 and 321, could be considered to be a proportionate restriction
on the freedom of expression of an organisation that was clearly not one of those moneyed interests
whose domination of the airwaves the legislation sought to guard against. After all, it might have been
possible to have created a more nuanced statutory regime that would have rationed airtime or capped
expenditure so as to prevent such dominance and consequent distortion of the playing field, yet still
would have allowed groups such as ADI to use television to get their message across. However, Lord
Bingham declined to pursue this line of inquiry. In his view it was difficult to see how any system of
rationing or capping could be devised that would not be circumvented, and it would be difficult to
envisage any such system not according excessive discretion to officials, thereby leading to many
legal challenges. Lord Bingham pointed out that broadcasters had a duty to present a “fair, balanced
and reasonably comprehensive cross-section of public opinion on the issues of the day”, and that this
difficult task would be rendered even harder if account had to be taken of political advertising.
Furthermore, he observed that the “Government had considered that no fair and workable
compromise solution could be found which would address the problem--a judgment which Parliament
accepted” and which his Lordship saw “no reason to challenge”.44
*P.L. 97 Lord Bingham also pointed out that whilst broadcast political advertisements were
prohibited, other media outlets remain available such as newspapers, magazines, direct mailshots,
billboards, public meetings and marches.45 There did not exist, as the European Court had found
there to have been in Bowman v UK (a case involving a £5 limit on third party expenditure at election
time), a total barrier to the communication of ADI's views.46 Lord Bingham noted that differential
treatment of the broadcast media was justified and because of the “greater immediacy and impact of
television and radio advertising … it [was] not really a matter of serious debate but that the broadcast
media [was] more pervasive and potent than any other form of media”.47
Notwithstanding these arguments, the House of Lords still had to deal with the Strasbourg judgment
of VgT which, as noted above, strongly suggested that such an all encompassing ban would
constitute a breach of art.10 and which, by virtue of s.2 of the HRA, had to be “taken into account …
in so far as, in the opinion of the court … it [was] relevant to the proceedings”. In the event, however,
VgT was side-stepped with apparent ease. Lord Bingham considered that the argument that it was
necessary to keep the “playing field of debate … so far as practicable level” had not been “deployed”
to its “full strength” in VgT. Furthermore, VgT was distinguishable as in that case the applicant had
been seeking to respond to commercials broadcast by the meat industry.48 In addition, Lord Scott
stressed that judgments of the European Court were highly fact sensitive, so that it was “perilous to
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transpose the outcome of one case to another where the facts are different”.49
It is important to bear in mind the insistence of the European Court that in cases such as this,
involving “controversial opinions pertaining to modern society in general”, the margin of appreciation
available to the state *P.L. 98 is reduced.50 One might have thought that the limited margin of
appreciation granted by the European Court would have been reflected, at municipal level, in a
narrow discretionary area of judgment being afforded by the domestic court to the legislature.
However, all three judges who made full speeches in ADI agreed that this was a case in which it was
appropriate for them to show deference to the judgment of Parliament.51 Lord Bingham noted that
there was no settled practice among European states on the issue of political advertising, “a factor
tending to widen the margin of appreciation” and it “may be that each state [was] best fitted to judge
the checks and balances necessary to safeguard, consistently with Art.10, the integrity of its own
democracy”.52
Judicial review of the “devices of democracy”
The case of ADI poses important questions about the proper role of the courts as overseers of the
democratic process.53 Frederick Schauer, writing in the context of First Amendment challenges to
legislative restrictions on campaign finance in the United States, touches on the fundamental question
at the centre of the case:
“Absent textual or historical guidance, how are we to think about the case in which some democratic
body--say, a legislature--makes a decision about the devices of democratic process themselves? Is
the appropriate posture toward a legislative act that specifies democratic procedures to be one of
deference or one of skepticism? It is at this point that the questions about the status of democratically
enacted procedural decisions are squarely before us, and it is at this point that we confront the central
question of the proper role, if any, of courts as overseers of democratic procedure.”54
A “posture … of deference”
The question of the court's role in the judicial review of this “device … of democratic process” under
the HRA has been considered by the House of Lords before in R. (on the application of the ProLife
Alliance) v BBC. 55 This case *P.L. 99 concerned a refusal by the BBC and independent
broadcasters to transmit a Party Election Broadcast (by an anti-abortion political party) which
graphically depicted an abortion, on the grounds that such a broadcast would infringe statutory and
“quasi-statutory” standards of taste and decency.56 The party, the ProLife Alliance, challenged the
refusal, though not the compatibility of the taste and decency guidelines themselves, claiming that it
constituted a breach of its rights under art.10 ECHR. The Court of Appeal agreed and adopted a
posture of “skepticism” with regard to the broadcaster's decision. Laws L.J. held that the case
concerned “censorship of political speech”, and affirmed that it was “difficult to think of a context in
which the claims of free expression [were] more pressing”.57 The court had an “overarching”
constitutional responsibility to protect political speech and, as a consequence, “had to decide for itself
whether this censorship was justified”. Thus the Court of Appeal concluded that, in the context of the
“cockpit of a general election”, the weight to be accorded to the broadcaster's views were “modest at
best”.58
The majority of the House of Lords, however, roundly rejected what Lord Hoffmann referred to as this
“fundamentalist” approach.59 In the absence of a compatibility challenge to the guidelines themselves,
the majority considered that they had to defer to the greater expertise of broadcasters who were
merely imposing taste and decency standards set down by Parliament. Lord Hoffmann considered
that, “[g]enerally accepted standards on these questions [were] not a matter of intuition on the part of
elderly male judges”.60 The Court of Appeal had “carried out its own balancing exercise” between the
requirements of freedom of political speech and the protection of the public from being
distressed--and “that was not a legitimate exercise for the courts in this case”--for Parliament had
decided where the balance should be struck.61
In ADI the House of Lords likewise adopted, to use Schauer's phrase, a “posture … of deference”.
The judgment of their Lordships crucially hinged upon their acceptance that Parliament was in the
best position to make decisions about the “devices of democratic process”, even in the face of strong
authority to the contrary from the European Court of Human Rights. Lord Bingham *P.L. 100
explained that there were three main reasons for giving “great weight” to the judgment of Parliament:
• it was “reasonable to expect that our democratically elected politicians will be particularly sensitive to
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the measures necessary to safeguard the integrity of our democracy”;
• Parliament had passed the legislation even though the Minister had made a statement under
s.19(1)(b) of the HRA to the effect that she was unable to make a statement of Convention
compatibility; and
• legislation could not be framed to address particular cases, it had to lay down “general rules” and
general rules meant that a “line must be drawn, and it [was] for Parliament to decide where”.62
Since the affording of this wide discretion was determinative for the disposal of ADI's appeal, these
three reasons warrant further analysis.
Elected politicians are particularly sensitive to the needs of our democracy
Traditionally two basic justifications have been advanced for courts showing deference to other
constitutional actors. The first of these relates to “democratic legitimacy”. As Sandra Fredman
explains:
“… where there are no predefined legal standards and opinions might reasonably differ on the
outcome, decisions can only be made by weighing up different interests according to political criteria.
Judges have no legitimate means to make such decisions: they can only be taken by those who must
be responsive to the range of affected interest groups and face the consequences of their decisions
through their accountability to the electorate.”63
The second relates to the “relative institutional competence” of the decision makers in question.
Sandra Fredman, again, notes that:
“… judges are not competent to make decisions where the facts are not accessible to the courts,
either because, like national security, they need to be kept secret, or because, like socio-economic
policy, they are wide-ranging and polycentric. The bipolar, reactive, dispute-based nature of judicial
processes means that judges cannot achieve the wide lens necessary to make polycentric decisions.”
64
The first of Lord Bingham's reasons for affording “great weight” to Parliament's judgment consists of a
conflation of these two justificatory principles, stressing *P.L. 101 as it does the democratically
elected nature of politicians and their particular sensitivity to the measures necessary to safeguard
democratic integrity.
At first blush it certainly seems to be right that democratically elected politicians are best placed to
decide on the measures necessary for the protection of democracy itself.65 After all, they are
democratically accountable to the electorate--if the majority do not approve of what they do, they can
be voted out. In addition they have specific and unrivalled expertise in the “devices of democracy”
themselves--the process, mechanics and machinations of democratic process--in other words they
have institutional competence. It is perhaps not surprising therefore that the House of Lords adopted
a deferential stance. Parliament and its MPs would seem to be in an unassailable position as regards
decision making on the questions of how the nuts and bolts of our democracy should function--in
particular in this context, how far freedom of expression should be restricted in order to maintain the
level playing field of political discourse.
On reflection, however, this coincidence of democratic legitimacy and institutional competence is not
quite as impregnable as it first appears. It is a truism that the very democratic legitimacy of MPs
means that they have a vested interest in the type of process being as favourable to them as
possible. The fact that they are, in Lord Bingham's phrase, “particularly sensitive to the measures
necessary to safeguard the integrity of our democracy”, actually works against the contention that
they have democratic legitimacy in this context. Frederick Schauer summarises the point:
“… [D]ebates over democratic procedure are often motivated by the combatants' respective views
about which procedure will best serve their own substantive interests … procedural decisions are
made largely by selecting the procedures most likely to favour those doing the selecting.”66
MPs are not disinterested actors doing the bidding of the electorate; they have a very real interest in
how the process plays out. Their institutional competence is down to the fact that they are steeped in
the world of party politics, and this must actually count against the assertion that they should be
afforded deference on account of their democratic legitimacy, at least in this particular context.67
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The section 19(1)(b) statement
The second reason given by Lord Bingham for why the judgment of Parliament “should not be lightly
overridden” was that it had “resolved uniquely, since *P.L. 102 the 1998 Act came in to force in
October 2000, that the prohibition of political advertising on television and radio may possibly though
improbably, infringe Art.10 but has nonetheless resolved to proceed under s.19(1)(b) of the Act”.68
Section 19 of the HRA requires that Ministers responsible for government Bills must either make a
written statement that, in their view, the Bill is compatible with Convention rights (s.19(1)(a)) or that,
even though they are unable to make such a statement, they wish the House to proceed with the Bill
anyway (s.19(1)(b)). The s.19 requirement was introduced so that in the early stages of a Bill's
development it would be possible to identify potential conflicts with Convention rights, consider
alternative means to secure the aims of legislation in a more rights compliant way, and “reach a
judgment about whether the proposed legislative goal and means are justified despite their adverse
implications for rights”.69
Hitherto the status of s.19 statements has been down-played by the judiciary. In R. v A, Lord Hope
said that s.19 statements,
“… may serve a useful purpose in Parliament. They may also be seen as part of the parliamentary
history, indicating that it was not Parliament's intention to cut across a Convention right … But they
are no more than expressions of opinion by the minister. They are not binding on the court, nor do
they have any persuasive authority. ”70
Clearly this reluctance to give weight to s.19 statements can be explained in terms of judicial
independence and the separation of powers. If the judges were to take such statements into account
as indicative of Convention compatibility, it would undermine their constitutional role as interpreters of
legislation.71 Moreover, it would significantly diminish the powers conferred by ss.3 and 4 of the HRA
itself, if the balance of judicial decisions on human rights could be tipped by the presence of a
s.19(1)(a) statement.
*P.L. 103 All this is readily understandable in terms of ministerial statements of compatibility under
s.19(1)(a). However, the decision in ADI involved a strange twist on this logic: one of the key factors
leading Lord Bingham to afford a wide discretion to Parliament in the case, thus allowing the
contested provisions to be found compatible with art.10, was the ministerial statement to the effect
that the measure was possibly (or probably72 ) not compatible with art.10. This statement of possible
(or probable) non-compatibility was then used as evidence of the provision's compatibility. This cuts
directly against the received judicial wisdom on the relevance of s.19 statements; that they are not
binding nor do they have even persuasive authority.73 But it is also, surely, verging on judicial
doublethink. Even though the executive that introduced this Bill, and the legislature that passed it,
clearly had serious doubts about its compatibility, the House of Lords nevertheless took this as one of
the factors requiring it to defer to Parliament's presumed “hope” that the measure might be compliant
with the ECHR after all.
A line must be drawn somewhere: if you are on the wrong side of it--tough!
Lord Bingham's third stated reason for showing deference to Parliament was that,
“… legislation cannot be framed so as to address particular cases. It must lay down general rules …
A general rule means that a line must be drawn, and it is for Parliament to decide where. The drawing
of a line inevitably means that hard cases will arise falling on the wrong side of it, but that should not
be held to invalidate the rule if, judged in the round, it is beneficial.”74
This strong statement in favour of accepting Parliament's view of when and where “bright lines”
should be drawn in legislation perhaps tends to belie the complexity of the true position. In The
Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart recognised that there exists a fundamental tension in all legal systems
between the need for laws to be certain so that individuals are able to conduct their lives in a
reasonably predictable environment, and the need for laws to be sufficiently flexible or fact-sensitive
so as to be able to take account of differing factual situations.75 Indeed, in the case law of the
European Court and under the HRA, there have been many cases in which general rules have been
found to constitute disproportionate interferences with Convention rights on account *P.L. 104 of their
being insufficiently sensitive to the particular circumstances of those affected.76
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As Sales and Hooper explain, one of the main factors that the courts take into account in deciding
whether a fact-insensitive law constitutes a proportionate interference with a Convention right is the
degree of difficulty that the state would encounter if it chose to introduce a more fact-sensitive rule.
Thus, for example, the question of whether a more fact-sensitive law would frustrate the ability of the
state to pursue its primary policy aim or whether the affording of discretion to those charged with
applying the law might cause problems.77
During the passage of the Communications Bill, the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), while
acknowledging the need to protect “equality of opportunity for political expression”, voiced concerns
over the possible incompatibility of a total ban on political advertising on television and radio in the
light of the VgT judgment.78 The JCHR recommended that the “Government examine ways in which
workable and Convention-compatible restrictions of this kind could be included in the Bill”.79 The
Government responded that it had considered,
“… an alternative regime based on specific prohibitions, such as banning all party political advertising,
and all political advertising of any kind around the time of elections or referenda, coupled with other
rules to avoid the predominance of any particular point of view, to provide visual or audible
identification of political advertisements, and to control the scale of political advertising in terms both
of broadcasting time and the proportion of advertising revenue that a broadcaster is permitted to
derive from political advertising. We have concluded that it would be very difficult to make such a
scheme workable, and that in any event it would fall significantly short of the present outright ban and
allow a substantial degree of political advertising to be broadcast.”80
It will be readily apparent that this consists of little more than a bald assertion akin to saying “we have
gone away and looked at some possible alternatives *P.L. 105 and, trust us, they really aren't
workable”. Nevertheless, the JCHR accepted it at face value. Moreover, the JCHR took the view that
the Government's decision to press ahead did not evince a lack of respect for human rights and was
legitimate in the circumstances.81
In ADI their Lordships did not explicitly relate the history of the debate during the passage of the Bill to
the assertion that “a line must be drawn” somewhere. However Lord Bingham did narrate the history
of this debate in detail.82 He briefly considered the reasons for discounting alternative, more nuanced,
restrictions, concluding that “the Government judged that no fair and workable compromise solution
could be found which would address the problem, a judgment which Parliament accepted” and which
he saw “no reason to challenge”.83
It is instructive to compare the brevity of the reasoning and debate over the Communications Bill with
the extremely long, detailed and comprehensive reasoning proffered by the Irish Government during
the parliamentary debate concerning a 1999 Bill to remove the legislative ban on broadcast religious
advertising.84 In Murphy the European Court drew upon this detailed reasoning.85 It was one of the
major factors leading to its conclusion that there existed “highly relevant reasons justifying Ireland's
prohibition of broadcast religious advertisements”.86
However, the courts in the United Kingdom are not permitted to take into account the paucity of
reasoning or debate on a Bill in Parliament as a factor affecting the proportionality of resulting
legislation. As Lord Nicholls stated in Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No.2) :
“The proportionality of legislation … is not to be judged by the quality of reasons advanced in support
of it in the course of parliamentary debate. Lack of cogent justification in the course of parliamentary
debate is not a matter which ‘counts against’ the legislation on issues of proportionality. The court is
called upon to evaluate the proportionality of the legislation, not the adequacy of the minister's
exploration of the policy options or of his explanations to Parliament.”87
Nevertheless, it must be noted that there is a certain tension on this point with the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights. For example, in Hirst v UK (No.2), one of the reasons why the
Grand Chamber found that the blanket ban on the right of convicted prisoners to vote was in breach
of art.3 of Protocol No.1, was that Parliament had never “sought to weigh the competing interests or
to assess the proportionality of [the] *P.L. 106 … ban”.88 Given the absence of real debate on the
blanket ban on political broadcast advertisements--essentially Parliament simply accepted the
Government's assurance that it had considered alternatives and that they were unworkable--it may be
that if the matter ever comes before the European Court, this would indeed “count against” it on the
issue of proportionality.89
The whole concept of judicial deference has been the subject of intense academic criticism. Some
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have argued that it should have no place at all in human rights adjudication given the scheme
introduced by the HRA which scrupulously preserves the ability of Parliament to pass incompatible
laws if it so desires.90 Whatever view is taken on this debate generally, it is submitted that there are
flaws with the reasons advanced by Lord Bingham for affording great weight to Parliament's judgment
in the particular context of the ban on political broadcast advertising.
Their Lordships' Parthian shots
Despite finding for the Government and refusing ADI's application for a declaration of incompatibility,
their Lordships nevertheless let fly several Parthian shots at ss.319 and 321.91 Thus, despite the
apparently bleak prognosis for those wishing to engage in advocacy advertising on television and
radio, there are some scraps of comfort that a potential future challenger might draw from the
judgment.
Lord Bingham, noting that the pro-vegetarian advertisements in VgT had been in response to
commercial campaigns by the meat industry, said that:
“If … a body … had grounds for wishing to counter the effect of commercial advertising bearing on an
issue of public controversy, it would have strong grounds for seeking to put its case in the ordinary
course of broadcast programmes. The broadcaster, discharging his duty of impartiality, could not
ignore such a request.”92
In the same vein, Lord Scott stated that the dismissal of ADI's appeal should not be taken as “franking
sections 319 and 321 against any possible attack on Art.10 grounds”.93 He noted that a “good deal of
commercial advertising [was] likely to be objectionable to the principles of some section of the viewing
public”, and he gave a number of examples to this effect. Thus advertisements for zoos or circuses
might offend ADI and its supporters; adverts for burgers might offend those groups who disagree with
the way the beef cattle are reared *P.L. 107 and slaughtered; and adverts for Christmas turkeys
might offend those who oppose the factory farming of poultry. Moreover, he commented:
“Why should these organisations not counter the broadcasting of advertisements that offend their
principles with the broadcasting of their own advertisements promoting their principles? It was not
suggested that the purpose of ADI's ‘My Mate's a Primate’ campaign was to counter the broadcasting
of advertisements promoting a zoo or zoos in which primates were kept in cages but if that had been
the case the arguments justifying the statutory prohibition might have been difficult.”94
Lord Scott also noted that the width of the statutory prohibition was “remarkable”--and that it appeared
to withhold from any organisation whose objects were, “wholly or mainly to bring about changes in the
law, the ability to place for broadcasting advertisements with no political content whatever … or an
advertisement with an entirely neutral political content …”.
Even Baroness Hale, whose speech is perhaps the most unequivocal in favour of the prohibition,95
acknowledged that the issue was whether the ban “as it applie[d] to these facts [was] proportionate”,
but that there “may be room for argument” had they been different.96
These obiter dicta make clear that a possible future challenger--for example, one claiming the right to
respond to a particular advertising campaign--might well secure a declaration of incompatibility.97
However, whilst providing a ray of hope for future challengers, from a free speech point of view these
dicta seem to cast as much shadow as they do light.
A right to respond?
It has frequently been stated that art.10 does not confer a right of access to broadcasting facilities. In
ProLife Alliance, Lord Hoffmann stated that there was “no human right to use a television channel”98
and the (now defunct) European Commission of Human Rights took the view that art.10 could “not
*P.L. 108 be taken as including a general and unfettered right for any private citizen or organisation
to have access to broadcasting time … in order to forward its opinion”.99 However, the implication in
Lord Bingham's and Lord Scott's speeches is that if an organisation wishes to respond to an
advertising campaign in the broadcast media, then it may indeed be able to claim an enforceable right
of access to broadcasting facilities.
One example of how this could play out is in relation to the current debate over climate change.
Environmental issues, once considered to be peripheral, are now located at the centre of the party
political agenda.100 Either because of genuine concern over the perils of global warming, or because
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of a perception that “playing the green card” will go down well with increasingly environmentally aware
voters, political capital is now frequently made by main-stream politicians proclaiming green policies.
101
Commercial organisations have not been slow to jump aboard this (carbon neutral) bandwagon and
produce a spate of television commercials that claim green credentials for their products.102 An
environmental NGO might wish to counter such green claims by broadcasting its own advertisement
explaining that, whilst such products may be less damaging than their nongreen alternatives, they are
nevertheless more damaging to the environment than not consuming at all.103 Such a group would,
according to their Lordships, have a strong case even if the organisation or the advert's content fell
within the definitions set out in s.321.
One might wonder, however, why this new “right of response” should be restricted to such narrow,
“rebuttal” type situations. There is a strong argument that the entire edifice of commercial
advertising--persuading as it does millions of people literally to “buy into” a certain version of
unbridled free market consumerism--is, in a very real sense, “political”. Jonathan Porritt has referred
to consumerism as “our pastime, our zeitgeist, our ideology *P.L. 109 all rolled into one”104 ; a “big
idea … more powerful than any cause or even religion, [reaching] into every corner of the globe”.105 It
is difficult to see why, in response to this all pervasive ideological onslaught, a generalised
anti-consumerism message--“stop shopping”--should not be permitted on television screens.
One might go further still. If an organisation has the right of access to broadcast facilities in order to
counter the message of commercial organisations with which it disagrees, why should it not be
permitted to initiate such a discourse? Why should such a group have to bide its time and wait until its
opponents throw the first punch? Why can't it, to coin a phrase, “get its retaliation in first”? If, to take
one of Lord Scott's examples, an organisation opposes factory farming on the grounds of cruelty to
animals, why must it wait for the producers of factory farmed meat to advertise their product in order
to be able to respond using the same powerful medium? The adverts which trigger its right of
response will, presumably, lead to an increase in sales of the factory farmed brand in question,
thereby fostering the increases in the very animal cruelty that the campaign group opposes.
In addition to the above, Lord Bingham proposed one further scenario in which an issue of
compatibility over the ban may arise--if an advertisement were rejected as “political” when it did not
fall within s.321(3)(a)-(e) or (g)106 but solely within s.321(3)(f): “influencing public opinion on a matter
which, in the UK, is a matter of public controversy”. In such a case, Lord Bingham considered that
“there might well be scope for resort to section 3” of the HRA, which would require that, as far as
possible, the provision be read and given effect in a way that was compatible with art.10.
This potentially opens the door for a whole range of advocacy advertising on important issues,
notwithstanding the fact that they are classified as “political” according to the terms of the statutory
definition itself (s.321(3)(f)), and even if they are not seeking to “counter” the effects of a particular
commercial campaign. If, for example, a group similar to ADI did not aim specifically to “achieve
changes in the law and public policy”,107 but merely sought to influence public opinion on a
controversial matter, its advert should, on this basis, be permitted.
However, the hiving off of this single statutory category as being susceptible to potential art.10
challenge is difficult to sustain. If a matter is of genuine public controversy it is scarcely conceivable
that it can be insulated from the worlds of law and politics. Such issues are constantly taken up as
causes by individual politicians in response to the views of their constituents, or by political parties in
response to shifts in public opinion. Frequently these engagements result *P.L. 110 in the adoption of
new policies and/or proposals for legislation, thus bringing the subject-matter of the original advert
within the ambit of one or more of the other statutory categories (s.321(3)(a)-(e) or (g)). Are we to say
that an advert purely on a matter of public controversy (i.e. one falling solely within s.321(3)(f)) will be
permitted in order to influence public opinion--but that if it succeeds (with the result that a politician or
political party takes it up as a campaign or policy, thereby causing it to overflow into the other
statutory categories), it will, at that point and for that reason, be banned?108
Conclusion
At this point in the analysis we founder upon a paradox lurking like a hidden boulder beneath the calm
surface of the House of Lords' overall approach. It will be recalled that the outcome of ADI hinged
upon judicial deference to Parliament's view that it was not possible to devise an alternative scheme
that was workable. Hence the continued need for the blanket ban. Their Lordships accepted
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Parliament's view that this area was not amenable to implementing a more nuanced scheme that
would take account of individual cases; that this was an issue which demanded a bright line rule.
What is more, and perhaps most crucially, Parliament, with its greater institutional competence and
democratic legitimacy, was in the best position to make this judgment, which should accordingly be
given “great weight”.
But the Parthian arrows that their Lordships released brought this shibboleth crashing down. Having
given great weight to Parliament's judgment that this matter was not amenable to an approach that
took account of individual cases, with the very next breath the court hypothesised individual cases
with slightly altered factual matrices that would be likely to result in breaches of art.10. Their
Lordships thereby reintroduced the very discretion, uncertainty, and scope for challenge that the wide
blanket ban was designed to preclude.109
It is as if the House of Lords could not wholly commit itself to the emasculated conception of its role
that the ratio of the case would seem to demand. On the substantive question--of where the
appropriate balance between freedom of political expression and equality of political opportunity
should be struck--it could not quite bring itself to forsake freedom of expression and to put all its chips
in the equality side of the scales. Having showed obeisance to the sovereignty of Parliament, it
nevertheless refused to “abdicate [its] responsibility” as the “guardian of human rights”.110 The tension
between its *P.L. 111 traditional role as dutiful servant doing Parliament's bidding and its newfound
role under the 1998 Act is palpable. Having apparently been in full-on retreat it could not resist
swivelling in the saddle and letting fly; and several of those barbed arrows hit their mark. The ban on
political broadcast advertising that the Government had been so insistent was necessary in its all
embracing form is now, it is submitted, severely wounded.
To return to the underlying procedural question--what is the appropriate role of the court when called
upon to review the devices of democracy? The impression given by their Lordships in this case is that
they are unable to make up their minds. This ambivalence explains their initial posture of deference to
Parliament's judgment and subsequent adumbration of exceptions which successfully undermine the
results of that very posture. It is submitted that, rather than getting itself into this doctrinal pickle, it
would have been preferable for the House of Lords to have used the scheme set up by Parliament
itself, in the Human Rights Act, and made a declaration of incompatibility. The matter would then have
passed back to the democratically accountable forums for consideration. As it stands, however,
uncertainty is rife--paradoxically the very situation the Government and Parliament scrupulously
sought to avoid by enacting the blanket ban in the first place.
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